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THE UTOPIA OF TRANSPARENCY: PLATFORM 
HUMANISM AND TECHNOCRACY IN FACEBOOK’S 
TRANSPARENCY DISCOURSE
Abstract. this article introduces the concept of ‘platform 
humanism’ to examine the discourse on communica-
tive transparency and social accountability adopted by 
online intermediaries and service providers. By critical-
ly analysing Facebook’s adoption of humanistic themes 
in the context of its corporate communications along 
with more opaque social responsibility practices, this 
article intends to provide empirical and critical insights 
into the political economy of online platforms. It iden-
tifies the transparency discourse as a key ideological 
element of the digital platform economy, characterises 
Facebook’s transparency discourse as being outwardly 
dominated by a humanistic communitarian terminol-
ogy, while relying heavily on quantification, arguments 
for self-regulation, and implied consent practices.
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pia, online platforms
Introduction
“Transparency” has become a catchall term for a range of practices per-
taining to accountability in governance. Public and private institutions alike 
are concerned with public image and messages surrounding their ‘brands’. 
Government accountability and anti-corruption measures promoted in the 
name of greater transparency are in turn presented as a gain for democracy. 
Multinationals tout their availability to self-regulate or to provide transpar-
ent information about their processes as protections for their clients and as 
proof of their socially responsible operations. Structured rules for accounta-
bility and oversight in public and private governance, often as social respon-
sibility practices, have been introduced at the national and international lev-
els. The technology sector and in particular online service providers (OSP) 
have adopted transparency as a core element of their social responsibility 
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discourse in which the notion is linked back to the utopian representations 
of the digital world prevalent in the early stages of massification of the 
Internet. In the context of the current worldwide debate on Internet regula-
tion and governance, casting a critical light on the discourse of transparency 
allows a better understanding of how it is deployed in order to delineate 
positions regarding the future of the digital world. 
In recent years, transparency has been a defining feature of the trust 
model put forward by OSPs as they face both governmental and consumer 
pressure to be more forthcoming in their approach to user data and sur-
veillance. The transparency discourse simultaneously allows OSPs to offer 
users a measure of reassurance as to the protection of their rights, and to 
address regulatory and other risks pertaining to their corporate image and 
branding (arising from public scandals, for instance). Facebook is of inter-
est in this regard since it has been in the public eye for the last decade as a 
fast-growing online intermediary with a vast public and the corresponding 
responsibility for its users’ data. Further – as highlighted by studies of the 
political economy of online communication (Bilić, 2018; Mosco, 2009; Dijck, 
2013; Fuchs, 2017; Sandoval, 2014) – the company reveals the challenges 
in managing the risks that arise in digital communication (namely security, 
privacy and consent issues, but also risks stemming from systemic moral 
hazards such as content management practices and information manipula-
tion). These risks are typically addressed by the company (and other OSPs) 
through the quantified disclosure of data, which is (as will be seen below) 
more akin to a procedural self-regulation than to a significant engagement 
with the concerns of users and the online commons. 
This article introduces the term “platform humanism” to refer to the 
construction of Facebook’s discourse surrounding the language of human 
rights and privacy. “Platform humanism” points to the somewhat paradoxi-
cal – walking a line between humanistic mission and commercial power – 
discursive nexus deployed by OSPs and digital platforms in which the users’ 
rights and interests are presented as fully aligned and protected by the OSPs 
themselves against the abuses of governments and the overreach of regula-
tion. By critically analysing the ‘platform humanism’ discourse in the con-
text of the corporate communications and social responsibility practices of 
OSPs (specifically Facebook, as one of the most successful and far-reaching 
companies in the digital world), against its ideological and socio-political 
backdrop, this article intends to provide empirical and critical insights into 
the political economy of online platforms. It specifically identifies the trans-
parency discourse as a key element of the ideological framework for the 
digital platform economy. 
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Theoretical framework
This article posits that the concept of transparency applied by Facebook 
in its reports and practice enacts both its strategic priorities and its analysis of 
the context’s communication challenges. The practice of transparency con-
sists of (institutional) behaviours putting this representation and conceptual 
work into practice. Thus, transparency discourses constitute an apt object of 
analysis to understand the ideological dimensions of transparency. One can 
analyse the background features and highlight the presuppositions of the 
representation by looking into the choice of procedures, their reach and 
the discursive presentation of the agents. In order to examine the discursive 
practices of Facebook as a service provider and platform, and to assess their 
ideological elements, this research relies on multimodal critical discourse 
analysis, also known as MCDA (Machin and Mayr, 2012; Fairclough, 2012; 
Mayr, 2008; Van Dijk, 2005). MCDA is particularly useful for disclosing rele-
vant discursive and rhetorical choices in verbal and non-verbal communica-
tion. Critical discourse analysis attempts “to ‘denaturalise’ representations” 
(Machin and Mayr, 2012: 9) by unveiling their effects through the study of 
connotation, implicature, metaphor, modality and iconography in the target 
texts. CDA aims to uncover the ideological and political construction of rep-
resentations by social actors – meaningful choices expressing underlying 
structural conditions – through both normative and explanatory approaches 
(Fairclough, 2012: 9). It also investigates how discourses are operationalised 
and enacted in the world via concrete actions and initiatives, or via interac-
tional affordances (ibid.: 12). CDA contributes to the critical contextualisa-
tion of the disclosure of data by attempting to understand how disclosure 
and non-disclosure relate to the prevailing socio-political conditions as well 
as to the enunciator’s self-interest, and therefore cannot be taken as a simple 
reflection of intentionality or truth (Maingueneau, 2014: 58). It thus consid-
ers which data are disclosed and emphasised, in what manner and on which 
conditions (Van Dijk, 2005: 32). 
The corpus of the analysis presented in this article comprises trans-
parency reports and public statements published by Facebook and its 
representatives between 2013 and 2018. The main source is Facebook’s 
“Newsroom”, the company’s official corporate weblog. This choice is justi-
fied in the CDA context since it presents an opportunity to study Facebook’s 
discourse in its diachronic and synchronic dimensions, that is, in both its 
lexical and ideological evolution, and in its dialectical relation with ongoing 
debates on matters of governance and social responsibility. In other words, 
it is in the weblog that the company’s transparency discourse is presented. 
In “Newsroom”, the keyword “transparency” appears 80 times between 
2009 and December 2018, more prominently since 2016. The keyword 
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“consent”, on the other hand, appears in just 13 search results (11 of which 
are since 2017). These 93 blog entries constitute the main corpus of this 
analysis of Facebook’s transparency discourse, along with the company’s 
Transparency Report and Community Standards portals. The portals were 
also analysed in their data-driven and iconographic dimensions, as well as 
in their role in operationalising the discourse set out in the weblog. Other 
elements drawn from media sources were helpful in framing and contextu-
alising the main corpus – reports, interviews and statements from the com-
pany and its representatives. 
The aim is to present a focused critical analysis of Facebook’s trans-
parency discourse, particularly its political and ideological dimensions as 
symptoms of the company’s policy and economic strategies. Transparency 
discourse is taken to be a form of communication as well as of world-mak-
ing. It exhibits formal characteristics (disposition, coherence and articula-
tion of materials) along with verbal (statements, comments, explanations, 
interpretations in written and spoken form, along with datasets) and non-
verbal elements (graphs, images, pictures and tool design). The concepts of 
transparency outlined and compared in the following section shed light on 
how transparency can be interpreted as a form of mediation allowing both 
disclosure and concealment in communication.
Online transparency and social responsibility
There is a vast body of literature on the role of transparency as part of 
the larger issues of the social responsibility of online service providers as 
custodians of the online sphere. Issues of social responsibility, intellectual 
property, privacy and the public interest are addressed as matters of regu-
lation and governance, without separating social responsibility and trans-
parency – in their legal and economic aspects – from the context of com-
munication and the concentration of power and intellectual property on 
the global scale (Kohl, 2012; Fenster, 2006; Sandoval, 2014; Smyrnaios, 2016; 
Gillespie, 2010; Perset, 2010). In order to frame the discussion of online ser-
vice providers, their importance to global communication and the political 
economy of content and advertising industries, researchers have addressed 
different aspects of the roles OSPs play in this system. For example, Sarah T. 
Roberts refers to “commercial content moderation” to underline the often-
underplayed editorial role of OSPs as well as their use of human alongside 
algorithmic moderation processes (Roberts, 2018, 2016). Others point to 
the surveillance apparatus put in place for commercial purposes (Zuboff, 
2015; Trottier, 2016), which has strengthened the overall trend towards the 
generalisation of surveillance technologies (Gandy, 1989; Lyon, 2005). OSPs 
have also been studied as the main actors in the design and development 
Artur de MAtos Alves
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 56, 3/2019
783
of the “platform economy” or the “platform society” (Gillespie, 2010; Dijck, 
Waal and Poell, 2018; Williams, 2015) and the techno-social assemblage to 
which algorithmic governance and Big Data have given rise in the last dec-
ade (Diakopoulos, 2014; Rahwan, 2018). Emphasis has been placed on the 
rhetorical and ideological aspects of the platform economy (Pozen, 2018; 
Karatzogianni and Matthews, 2018; Dijck, 2013). 
The ideology of transparency has been shown to play a major part in 
this restructuring of the online sphere, marked by a transition to algorith-
mic accountability and surveillance as governance strategies (Ananny and 
Crawford, 2018; Rouvroy and Berns, 2013). In this context, transparency is 
analysed as data disclosure or demonstrative activity in the context of the 
platform economy, with the product of that activity of disclosure lacking 
the ethical coherence of communicational reciprocity or consent (Beer, 
2015; Bilić, 2018; Noble, 2018; Roberts, 2018). Coupled to this is the presup-
position of a specific type of audience – one with the literacy and knowl-
edge to engage with the ideological underpinnings as well as the quanti-
fied element (Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000; Turilli and Floridi, 2009; 
Christensen and Cheney, 2015; Muir, 2015). Transparency-as-ideology also 
figures prominently in Breton’s critique of the “utopia of communication” 
(Breton, 1997). Different aspects of this idea emerge from the changes to 
communication technologies brought by individualised mass communica-
tion: direct electronic democracy and accountability; global citizenship and 
responsibility; freedom of information; freedom of expression and of iden-
tity; the emergence of individualised media; instantaneous communication 
across the globe; finally, political and economic transparency in the global 
system. Olivier Aim points out that transparency is a perceived feature of 
the Internet as a technology, of the content of communications through that 
medium, and as an ideological substrate already in place in parliamentary 
democracies and market capitalism (2006: 33). Ideologically, then, the dis-
course of transparency has utopian overtones and is linked to the strong 
impact of information and communication technologies in the last 50 years, 
notably as a ready-to-use ethos for public consumption.1
Amitai Etzioni shows that the prevalent definition of transparency is lim-
ited to information disclosure to the public by an institution (2018: 182). 
1 the strongest criticisms of transparency target a radical version of transparency. At the core of this 
criticism lie are the ideas of self-disclosure and quantified measurements, seen as symptoms of weakened 
political, communicational and social bonds. In particular, transparency is regarded as eroding privacy 
and trust, fostering insincerity and voyeurism alike (Beygaert, 2011; Gallot and verlaet, 2016). Byung-
Chul Han denounces transparency as a false levelling ideal of conformity setting itself against the princi-
ples of social trust and the inherent ambivalence of trust in communication and political processes (2015: 
2–5). In this sense, transparency infiltrates social life, encouraging risk-aversion (controlling perception 
and opinion) and short-term techno-solutionism (using quantified data, communication technologies and 
ancillary resources to signal transparency and sincerity). ‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬
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In his own distinction between informal (“communitarian”) and formal 
(“social”) transparency, the former is voluntary and relies on sharing infor-
mation, potentially with added interpretive elements calling for communi-
tarian engagement in governance (Etzioni, 2010: 395). Formal transparency, 
contractual in nature, can be equated with a regulatory effort aimed at a spe-
cific shared understanding of the social role of institutions within a given 
socio-political model (for example, democratic governance and supervi-
sion). Whereas communitarian transparency retains the affective dimen-
sions of trust and consent, its formal counterpart is mandated and enforced 
(2010: 391). In this sense, strong transparency is necessarily linked to exter-
nal regulation. For Etzioni, the fact that regulation (and strong transparency 
as opposed to self-regulatory) has fallen out of favour is indicative of the 
genealogy of transparency and its ideological content. The transparency 
ideal fits with an atomistic view of society in which the empowerment of the 
individual keeps in check other political and economic power. Regulation is 
undesirable in this perspective because of the perceived delegation of deci-
sion power from the individual to the state (Etzioni, 2018: 186–87). In short, 
being transparent is presented as being superior to being subject to regu-
lation, and self-regulation is equated with the performative dimension of 
transparency. For example, insofar as transparency practices do not ascribe 
responsibility or sanction institutional behaviour, they provide no insight as 
to “how they make decisions, or the results of their actions” (Fox, 2007: 667). 
Extensive quantitative datasets, along with discursive framing, are employed 
as sense-making (Hansen et al., 2015). This leaves open the question of the 
value of information for individual or collective action, as opposed to the 
regulatory and enforcement approach (Etzioni, 2018: 188–96).
A noteworthy criticism of OSP transparency practices addresses the 
quantified character of the process: transparency is not held as a commu-
nicational value, nor as a property of the relation between the parties, but 
as a linear process of transmission to which the notion of responsibility 
(and, therefore, asymmetry) is ideologically attached. This communicational 
linearity of transparency initiatives such as reporting and data rendition 
provides very little by way of feedback mechanisms between stakehold-
ers (Fenster, 2006: 892–893, 2015: 153; Ananny and Crawford, 2018: 983). 
In reality, Fenster argues, these limitations arise from a cybernetic view of 
transparency (2015: 152) and the notion of a rational, information-process-
ing public in the era of communicative, platform or surveillance capitalism 
runs counter to the fact of the saturation of the public sphere with informa-
tion. This saturation, even if it does not entirely contradict the possibility 
of a rational deliberative online sphere, strains the belief in an ideal public 
capable of decoding and acting (ibid.). 
In short, most transparency-based communication is transmissive rather 
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than dialogical. A model of communicative transparency would require a 
transactional process and even a dimension of involuntary transparency 
(whereby information is forced out into the open) facilitated by regulatory 
measure and public oversight. Ultimately, conflating transparency with sur-
veillance or control assumes the existence of an audience and a guiding 
interpreting narrative (Beygaert, 2011: 63), as well as a shared performative 
stance (Gallot and Verlaet, 2016: 214). Status differentials are thus unavoid-
able (for example, between consumers and corporations, citizens and gov-
ernments, spectators and actors). The adherence to the norms of transpar-
ency generates a performance which, while mediated by the same social 
norms and possibly accelerated by the use of technologies, does not pro-
vide a radical form of visibility. Transparency does not automatically lead to 
a levelling of social relations or the universal disclosure of secrets. 
The genealogy and rhetoric of Facebook’s approaches to 
transparency
This section analyses Facebook’s discourse on transparency over the 
years. Examples are drawn from the analysis of the Newsrooms weblog 
and the Facebook Transparency Reports (FTR) pages. These sources, along 
with public statements and media reports, illuminate how the company 
constructs its social responsibility and, in particular, how it shapes ‘transpar-
ency’ in a quickly mutating context. 
From its inception at Harvard University as TheFacebook, and its early 
predecessor Facemash, the platform seemed to rely on the users’ willing-
ness to assent to a simplified view of sociability and consent. Paramount 
to this view was the users’ trust that their data would be safely kept in a 
‘neutral’ digital communication platform. This notion of transparent custo-
dianship has been the object of several inflections. The first initiative may be 
seen as part of the company’s effort to be transparent about its legal obliga-
tions to disclose user data to the state (law enforcement and surveillance 
agencies, as well as the courts). Facebook Transparency Reports (FTR)2 are 
available at a dedicated site, as are their Ad tools and Community Standards 
(Sonderby, 2017; Facebook, 2018c). Data on government requests are avail-
able since January 2013 and published every semester. In 2017 and 2018, 
the company was challenged over multiple revelations about the platform’s 
2 Interestingly, this page was called “Government requests” until 2017. As seen below, the title change 
is clearly related to a shift in focus away from surveillance issues and towards advertising source disclosure. 
Contrary to Google whose transparency reports date back to 2011 and have since become more detailed 
(Alves, 2016), until the change in designation and corresponding shift towards “reinforcing [Facebook’s] 
commitment to transparency”, the data released only pertained to Facebook responses to those requests 
(sonderby, 2017, 2018).
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role in allowing the spread of fake news and the undue use of user data 
by third parties before and during the 2016 Brexit referendum and the US 
presidential election (Cobbe, 2018; Hindman, 2018; Koebler, 2018). Facing 
close scrutiny of its business model, Facebook initiated a privacy and trans-
parency overhaul. The company published the platform’s Community 
Standards and, in a separate part of the FTR, disclosed the related enforce-
ment numbers and procedures (Facebook, 2018b,a). It is particularly inter-
esting to note the recontextualisation operation for the name “Community 
standards” – a set of norms and rules drafted behind closed doors with 
minor user input. Facebook published the full community standards and 
content moderation policies in April 2018 (Facebook, 2018b), 11 months 
after they were leaked to the Guardian newspaper (Hopkins, 2017).
Facebook’s discourse revolves around the word “community”. Content 
standards and reporting tools are presented as being community-oriented 
in both their wording (“Community standards”) and operation – for exam-
ple, community reporting and flagging are tools available to users to indi-
cate to Facebook content violating the terms of service or content policies. 
Facebook’s transparency discourse strongly suggests adherence to an infor-
mal, communitarian view of transparency, to use Etzioni’s terms. In practice, 
however, the company relies on the quantification of formalised processes 
of transparency – in both the case of external demands for user information 
and for platform content reviews. 
It is significant that the company insists on presenting itself for its 
homogenous sociability on the global scale. In fact, the abstraction “com-
munity” obscures the processes that shape decisions about platforms, while 
displacing responsibility onto a shared common space that is largely deter-
mined by the company.3 Until recently, the distinction between advertising 
and other targeted paid content was particularly opaque, and voluntary dis-
closure by Facebook relies on the creation of quantification tools and data-
bases that require significant interpretive work by the user in order to be 
effective as transparency tools (Facebook, 2018b). 
Transparency initiatives have been largely reactive. They are course-
corrections, continuing the pattern of a mismatch between the ‘community’ 
discourse of platform humanism and accountability to society. In the wake 
of the 2016 US elections, the company ran a campaign to contain and con-
trol the narrative of transparency in order to shape it as a public relations 
initiative. The recent transparency initiatives have followed the Cambridge 
3 Facebook’s discourse acknowledges neither the critical distinction between platform and commu-
nity nor the mediating role of the technosocial assemblage in the creation of a multiplicity of spaces and 
shared experiences (Feenberg and Bakardjieva, 2004; Alves, 2016). the concept of community is polyse-
mic and its applicability to online networks has been criticised in scholarship (for example, Barney, 2004; 
Couldry, 2014).
Artur de MAtos Alves
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 56, 3/2019
787
Analytica scandal, the #metoo movement, and external revelations (by whis-
tle-blowers and media reports) of the failure to address concerns about paid 
false advertising and misinformation (Gillespie, 2018; Cobbe, 2018; Fisher, 
2018; Angwin and Grassegger, 2017; Tobin, Varner and Angwin, 2017). The 
company has attempted to persuade the public and the governments that 
its internal governance mechanisms are sufficient. Mark Zuckerberg, the 
founder and CEO, appeared before parliamentary commissions in the USA 
and the EU, after having issued multiple public apologies for the platform’s 
role in spreading disinformation (Roose and Kang, 2018; Satariano and 
Schreuer, 2018). The course-correction measures put in place between 2017 
and 2019 included the above-mentioned publication of community stand-
ards and related enforcement metrics. Another innovation was the creation 
of a public, searchable database of political advertising on the platform, 
which included sources of funding, spending, and the ads themselves. The 
company also introduced new features allowing users to identify the ori-
gin of the sponsored content in their feeds. Independent media and activ-
ist organisations attempted to shed light on political advertising by intro-
ducing browser plugin-based ad transparency tools. However, Facebook’s 
changes to its code made at the time of introducing the new transparency 
features have blocked these tools, thereby neutralising a form of independ-
ent verification of its ad transparency initiatives (Merrill and Tobin, 2019). 
This is noteworthy and characteristic of the contradictions between plat-
form humanism discourse and action.
Even if the company has accrued power and users, its failure to fathom 
the relevance of the platform in public communication is still quite clear 
in its discourse. In fact, the content of the justifications and apologies has 
changed little since 2011, in what amounts to a formula:4
overall, I think we have a good history of providing transparency and 
control over who can see your information. that said, I’m the first to 
admit that we’ve made a bunch of mistakes. In particular, I think that 
a small number of high profile mistakes, like Beacon four years ago 
and poor execution as we transitioned our privacy model two years 
ago, have often overshadowed much of the good work we’ve done. 
(Zuckerberg, 2011)
The first admission by the CEO was followed by multiple transparency 
initiatives, including the “Government Requests” website (in 2013), as well as 
4 A formula, according to Krieg-Planque, is a “mandatory passage” through which actors build “con-
sensus and conflict”, which reflects different attributes and values in the positions they which to adopt or 
reject (cit. in Maingueneau, 2014: 98–99).
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significant changes to the platform regarding privacy options. Nevertheless, 
the company became further embattled as its content management strate-
gies and business model led to a proliferation of exploitative content prac-
tices, from undisclosed social experiments on the platform, clickfarms and 
clickbait sites, through to targeted disinformation and opaque political 
advertising (Tobin, Varner and Angwin, 2017; Valentino-DeVries, Larson 
and Angwin, 2017). In 2018, in a Q&A session with the CEO published in 
“Newsroom”, Zuckerberg addresses the issues of corporate and personal 
responsibility in much the same language: 
We didn’t focus enough on preventing abuse and thinking through 
how people could use these tools to do harm as well. that goes for fake 
news, foreign interference in elections, hate speech, in addition to devel-
opers and data privacy. We didn’t take a broad enough view of what 
our responsibility is, and that was a huge mistake. It was my mistake. 
(Facebook, 2018d)
Similar formulas appear multiple times across weblog entries over 
the years. The first is that of a “commitment to transparency”, appearing 
in two identically entitled posts in the “Newsroom” weblog in 2017 and 
2018 (“Reinforcing our commitment to transparency”), and a third one 
entitled “Our continued commitment to transparency” in November 2018 
(Sonderby, 2018b). This expression of commitment is formulaic to the point 
of being repeated in the last paragraph of similar weblog entries (Sonderby, 
2017, 2018a). Another instance is the expression of concern about Internet 
and service disruptions. Both occur whenever a new transparency report or 
initiative is introduced, suggesting an administrative logic requiring not just 
consistent rhetoric, but also a distancing from the turbulent politics of plat-
form transparency. Yet another significant recurring formula is the affirma-
tion of the commitment to “reform surveillance in a way that protects their 
citizens’ safety and security while respecting their rights and freedoms” 
(Sonderby, 2016). A common formula until recently, it is entirely absent on 
the two most significant documents on Facebook’s transparency policy in 
the corpus, pointing to a change in focus on transparency efforts since the 
Snowden revelations brought social-media-enabled surveillance to the fore.
The front page of FTR has changed over time. Currently, an embedded 
comparison or data visualisation functionality is exhibited on the front 
page, but is somewhat limited beyond that. The spreadsheet files are avail-
able for download for each report semester and do not contain all years 
for comparison or parsing. A FAQ section, along with links to other trans-
parency reports, policy commitments, and other initiatives, like the “Global 
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Government Surveillance Reform”5 (GNI) are provided on the front page. 
The most recent example of a self-regulation initiative is the proposed 
creation of a council that Zuckerberg referred to as a “supreme court”-like 
structure, tasked with applying the “community guidelines” (Klein, 2018). 
Both the council and the guidelines are to be picked by Facebook itself, 
although coupled with promises of “independent governance and over-
sight” (Zuckerberg, 2018).
Platform humanism as a strategic discourse and risk-management
The previous section provided several important instances where 
Facebook has attempted to reconstruct or reinforce its discursive commit-
ment to transparency. When considering the power asymmetry between 
the corporation and its users, as well as the effects of the company’s opera-
tion in the global public sphere, it is reasonable to adopt a critical distance 
towards two key dimensions of ‘transparency’. It is crucial to interrogate the 
idea of transparency put forward by the platform (and embedded in it as 
part of its techno-social assemblage), as well as the model of communica-
tion underlying the mode of relationship between the company, the users, 
and the socio-political contexts.
The expression “platform humanism” addresses in an ironic way the fact 
that OSPs often choose to simplify transparency by presenting it as a matter 
of advocacy for user rights. As shown above, Facebook rhetorically aligns 
itself with the interests of the users (in matters of human rights and pri-
vacy, for example), while both lobbying for deregulation and avoiding any 
engagement with serious concerns about their actions and business models. 
This illustrates the extent of the epistemological and ethical problem in the 
technologically mediated communication sphere (the sources of trust and 
accountability links between actors), as well as the existence of a material or 
practical problem (how to maximise the benefit of transparency practices 
for technological citizenship, or even defining a working set of guidelines). 
Facebook’s example shows three features that allow us to identify its trans-
parency discourse with a techno-utopian ideology, stemming from a reac-
tive posture: quantified proceduralism, self-regulation, and implied consent.
Quantified proceduralism is defined here as reliance on internal pro-
cesses and quantification for processing requests and delivering informa-
tion. Either in the shape of giving more access to internal information, or of 
new norms to apply in self-accountability procedures, with minor changes 
5 this is a coalition of companies (including, among others, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and 
twitter) advocating for changes in surveillance laws and practice, guided by the principle that “govern-
ment law enforcement and intelligence efforts should be rule-bound, narrowly tailored, transparent, and 
subject to strong oversight” (Reform Government surveillance 2018).
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the responses keep in place surveillance and data capture systems with little 
oversight and user participation. This trend was present when OSP transpar-
ency hubs and portals first appeared: the drive for radical transparency and 
democratic accountability promoted by Wikileaks, but also by Silicon Valley 
companies, political actors and activists, put intermediaries in the spotlight 
as political actors and enablers of political action. Data production and 
quantification are the first of the tenets of the Santa Clara Principles, and the 
one most easily followed by content moderators (Santa Clara Principles on 
Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation, n.d.; Hern, 2018). 
As shown above, a critical appraisal of transparency hinges on the analy-
sis of discourse and practices, and not necessarily on the definition of the 
concept as stated in the transparency reports of OSPs. From a phenomeno-
logical standpoint, a device is transparent insofar as it is unobtrusive and 
retains correspondence to its use. Conversely, the device is opaque when-
ever it becomes defective, absent or if it challenges the activity in which it 
is involved. TR reports, specifically, are presented as aiding transparency 
in as much as they illuminate the platform’s governance and allow users a 
measure of participatory clarity. Unveiling to some degree their decision 
processes regarding surveillance activities, advertising processes, interface 
design, content and algorithm management, OSPs allay concerns and reduce 
social risk in the short term. However, this method of transparency also 
introduces an element of obtrusiveness (discussed by Etzioni) that, far from 
regaining social trust, maintains self-regulation as an unexamined prem-
ise, prompting a further cascade of initiatives to demonstrate and perform 
‘transparency’. Again, if the transparency discourse appears to be formed 
around the promotion of humanistic values, its practical effects obtrude on 
the platform, and lay bare the difficulty – and the social and political risks – 
of attempting to mediate sociability on such a large scale. 
self-regulation. Besides its reactive character, corporate transparency is 
a largely unsupervised and unregulated subset of corporate social respon-
sibility practices. Unlike governmental transparency, which is connected 
to political legitimation processes and institutionalised as part of account-
ability systems or economic norms, corporate transparency communica-
tion practices stem from the imperatives of self-regulation and branding. 
As corporations attempt to control messaging and perceptions, transpar-
ency practices respond to the need for image and brand control, indicating 
the need for just-in-time communicative regulation of discourse. In other 
words, the periodical curated release of statements and of quantified data 
on transparency responds to the need for adjustments to society’s percep-
tions of the role of OSP and platforms in the lifeworld. As the perceived 
influence of these companies in the political, economic, social and cultural 
spheres expands, so too does public scrutiny. 
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Facebook has retained a single discursive position in order to address 
the perception of social risk arising from its mode of operation and busi-
ness model: self-regulatory measures are sufficient to address public con-
cerns and to restore trust in the internal review processes for both govern-
ment requests and the content circulated on the platform (whether coming 
from individuals or paying advertisers). The deployment of community 
standards and creation of human and automatic review systems exemplify 
this drive to reduce the company’s exposure to financial and political pres-
sure. Facebook’s transparency-based discourse highlights self-regulation 
and internal auditing mechanisms falling short of supervision or democratic 
accountability through regulation channels. 
Implied consent. As transparency refers to the invisibility of mediation, 
or a seamless access to the functional goal of the interaction, it is a desir-
able property for mediating apparatuses, and especially so in the realm of 
transmission of information: frictionless communication does away with 
noise or interference. An interface or mediating tool getting in the way of 
communication, or adding a source of noise, is altogether contrary to the 
ideal of technical transparency as found in the above-mentioned “utopia of 
communication”. Hence the need to ensure that interfaces not only allow a 
seamless experience, but also that their design does not subvert this techni-
cal transparency.
The interface (usually placed in the mediating position of a platform or 
intermediary) is, in fact, a dynamic part of communication. Much of the dis-
cussion on transparency is thereby akin to a debate on ethics and meta-com-
municative practices: which communicative stances (forms of exchanges of 
meaning, from metadata acquisition, personal interaction, to commercial 
exchanges) do the mediating interfaces allow when used as supports for 
communication, and how do different actors (visible or not) access those 
possibilities? In fact, power asymmetries in the interaction with and through 
the interfaces pose significant obstacles to a naïve notion of transparency, 
and raise the matter of the value of consent given through the checkboxes 
and jargon-filled terms of service typical of these services. The differences 
in power, in status and in access among the actors in shaping the platforms 
negate the possibility of immediate transparency. 
Transparency initiatives are valuable. They illuminate how commercial 
content management operates through datafication and commercialisation, 
how it depends on the streamlining and quantification of online human 
interaction, and the extent to which the economic and political realms now 
rely on the automated, objectified public sphere for surveillance, politi-
cal communication, propaganda and advertising. By making these link-
ages clearer, and bringing to light the mismatch between their discourse, 
their practices, the public interest, and the well-being of their users, OSP 
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transparency initiatives enable a form of transparency and provide a valu-
able, albeit limited, awareness of the political economy of platforms. 
The drive for OSP transparency may be understood in the context of the 
utopia of a democracy-expanding Internet. The stated goal of democratic 
transparency in “platform humanism” cannot be fully achieved through self-
regulatory, performative, quantified, controlled corporate communication 
because transparency is also a communicational problem. Transparency 
hubs offer a stage where the discourse of transparency is enacted in a 
dynamic portrait of the interaction of online platforms with social and polit-
ical institutions. These stages are uniquely suited to testing the ebb and flow 
of the discourse of openness and democratisation of the online sphere, 
and the efficacy of the underlying model of disclosure and transmission 
of quantified data in enacting transparency. Understanding transparency 
as a linear or self-disclosure process alone encourages approaches based 
on procedural quantification and implied consent. Facebook’s pattern of 
behaviour is similar to the reaction of other businesses to revelations about 
their failures to address risk in spite of repeated failures to comply with 
legal and ethical obligations. Notwithstanding the relatively strong regula-
tory oversight of banking, insurance, pharmaceutical and medical technol-
ogy, or auto-making companies, the abundance of examples from the last 5 
years alone shows that even institutionalised transparency requirements are 
difficult to implement and supervise.6 
Conclusion
This article explores Facebook’s approach to transparency and social 
responsibility in the last half decade. I introduce the term “platform human-
ism” to highlight that, far from being a mere product of public relations jar-
gon, the concept of transparency is deployed as part of a certain approach 
to regulating online speech and the political economy of the Internet. This 
article aims to contribute a new angle to the critical analyses of the current 
state of online communication by focusing on the online transparency dis-
course and practices of Facebook. It also addresses certain ethical and polit-
ical challenges of self-regulatory approaches in transparency practices by 
describing the contradictions of platform humanism. This article has shown 
some of these contradictions in Facebook’s case, in instances of the con-
struction of a formulaic human-centred public discourse on hand, and a set 
6 For example, the health technology company theranos was shown to have attempted to avoid 
supervisory efforts. the volkswagen group was found guilty of having developed technologies to subvert 
gas and particle emission tests of its engines. Boeing’s internal certification practices have been signalled in 
the context of the failures leading to two crashed 737 MAX planes.
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of practices marked by quantified proceduralism, an insistence on self-regu-
latory approaches and implied consent, on the other.
The way in which transparency is enacted by Facebook is largely reac-
tive. The timing of the initiatives taken map onto specific global events, 
usually involving the most powerful online platforms, and especially pub-
lic revelations or scandals which elicit social and political responses. These 
responses have hitherto taken the twin forms of communication crisis-man-
agement initiatives and of additions to the platform (for example, transpar-
ency hubs, portals and applications).7 
Despite the limitations of transparency as deployed by Facebook, this 
critique does not find it to be without value. OSP transparency reports 
illustrate the work being done to assert and expand users’ rights to infor-
mation about the services they use, and the challenge of providing them 
with a clear picture of the conflicts in the organisation and governance of 
the online ecology. Intermediaries are increasingly being held responsible 
for the commodification of online discourse and for the cooptation, if not 
the decay in quality, of the most readily available information on their plat-
forms. The political economy of the online world has crystallised into a con-
flict between the communicational and democratic need for transparency 
on one side, and the harnessing of information for automated exploitation, 
in which commercial concerns take precedence over public accountability, 
on the other. Facebook’s transparency model neither provides sufficiently 
robust responses to legitimate questions about the sources of information 
and funding in its services, nor does it allay doubts about the algorithmic 
neutrality of the corporate online sphere. 
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